Karttunen observed that, if the complement of an attitude sentence presupposes p, then that sentence as a whole presupposes that the attitude-holder believes p. I attempt to derive some representative instances of this generalization from suitable assumptions about the lexical semantics of attitude predicates. The enterprise is carried out in a framework of context change semantics, which incorporates Stalnaker's suggestion that presupposition projection results from the stepwise fashion in which information is updated in response to complex utterances. The empirical focus is on predicates of desire and on the contribution of counterfactual mood.
INTRODUCTION
How are presuppositions projected in prepositional attitude sentences? For example, given that Patrick sells his cello presupposes that Patrick owns a cello, what does (i) presuppose?
(1) Patrick wants to sell his cello.
At first sight, (i) likewise seems to presuppose that Patrick owns a cello. But then, it can also appear without contradiction in the context of (2).
(2) Patrick is under the misconception that he owns a cello, and he wants to sell his cello. Karttunen (1973b Karttunen ( , 1974 concludes that (1) presupposes, not that Patrick owns a cello, but rather that Patrick believes he owns a cello. This projection behavior is not peculiar to the verb want, but generalizes, according to Karttunen, to all other non-factive verbs of propositional attitude. (He cites believe, think, expect, fear, intend, suspect, assume, and hope as further examples (1973b: 4) . Explicitly excluded, beside factives, are verbs of saying.) They are all subject to the following rule (his (21) (1974: 189) with trivial changes).
(3) If a is a verb of propositional attitude, then a context c satisfies the presuppositions of 'aafi' only if B a (c) satisfies the presuppositions of </>; where *B a (c)' stands for the set of beliefs attributed to a in c.
Together with the rule for and (1974: 185):
(4) Context c satisfies the presuppositions of'^ and ip' just in case (i) c satisfies the presuppositions of^, and (ii) the context that results from c by the assertion of </> satisfies the presuppositions of xp.
(3) accounts for the intuition that (2) as a whole presupposes nothing. To presuppose nothing means to place no particular requirements on the initial context; in other words, a sentence presupposes nothing iff every possible context satisfies its presuppositions. Given (3) and (4), this is predicted for (2): whatever the initial context may have been like, the first conjunct creates from it an intermediate context in which Patrick is attributed the belief that he owns a cello, and that intermediate context thus satisfies the presuppositions of the second conjunct. But what about the intuition that (1) in isolation commits the speaker to Patrick's owning a cello? Karttunen speculates that this is attributable to some additional conversational principle to the effect that, unless it has been indicated otherwise, [Patrick] can be assumed to share the speaker's beliefs. In other words, there is a natural spill-over from [c] to [B Patrick (c) ]. Consequently, in situations where nothing has been said about [Patrick's] beliefs, one tends to think that, if the presuppositions of [(1) ] are satisfied, they are satisfied by virtue of the speaker's tacit assumption that [Patrick] shares his beliefs. (1973b: 6) I think that Karttunen's proposal was basically right, in its description of the facts as well as in its theoretical conception.
1 In fact, the present article does nothing more than spell it out in somewhat greater precision. This should make it easier to assess its merits and the objections against it. Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework. Sections 3 and 4 examine the semantics of verbs of belief and of various types of desire verbs in reports of realistic as well as counterfactual desires. Section 5 elaborates a bit more on the reasons why attitude verbs should superficially appear to be holes rather than filters.
In the examples below, I will use a variety of presupposition triggers, in particular definite descriptions (to which I here give a classical, Fregean, analysis) and too. I assume, perhaps simplistically, that for the purposes of this paper there is no relevant difference between the various kinds of triggers. I have nothing original to say about where presuppositions come from in the first place, what the set of triggers is, and what presupposition exactly each trigger contributes. (5) is the set of all worlds in which it isn't raining.
If you apply the CCP of not [it is raining] (the LF of it isn't raining) to W, what you get by (6) and
Actually, things are a bit more complicated, since so far we have disregarded presuppositions (taking it is raining, simplifying perhaps, to be an example of a sentence that presupposes nothing). The definition of the CCP of a sentence is supposed to encode not just its content but also its presupposition. The CCP of a sentence without any presupposition will be a total function from contexts to contexts (like the one defined in (5)), but in general CCPs are partial: they are defined only for those contexts that satisfy the presuppositions of the sentence in question. For example, John's cat is hungry presupposes that John has a unique cat, and this is reflected in the fact that the CCP of this sentence is only defined for contexts that entail that John has a unique cat. (The entailment relation between contexts is the subset relation.) (7) c + John's cat is hungry is defined iff c Q {w: John has a unique cat in w}; where defined, c + John's cat is hungry = [WECJohn has a hungry cat in w)
'Presupposition projection', according to this theory, arises from the way the definedness conditions of the CCPs of elementary sentences affect those of the CCPs of bigger constituents. For instance, (6) is really an abbreviated version of the following more explicit rule:
(8) c + not (j> is defined just in case c + <j> is, in which case c+ not(/> -c\(c + <j>).
and so the combined effect of (7) and (8) is to predict that not [John's cat is hungry] (presumably one of the Logical Forms of John's cat isn't hungry) also presupposes that John has a unique cat. More generally, (8) predicts negation to be a 'hole' in the sense of Karttunen (1973 a) . Notice that the spelled-out rule in (8) is, in a sense, fully recoverable from the abbreviated version of (6):
9 the added top line states just what it takes for the expression to the right of the equation sign below to denote a context-no more and no less. This is always so when we are dealing with the lexical entry of an item (such as here not) that doesn't contribute any presuppositions of its own. Only items that are themselves presupposition-triggers have in their entries additional, non-recoverable, definedness conditions. The fuller rule format of (8), while more explicit and therefore easier to use in proofs, has the disadvantage of superficially obscuring the difference. Below I will often use a compromise between the two formats: include the recoverable conditions, but in brackets.
BELIEF REPORTS
Now what would it mean to give an account within this framework of presupposition projection in attitude reports? Well, the central task is evidently to specify appropriate lexical entries for the attitude predicates, i.e. to give appropriate definitions of the CCPs of sentences of the form 'a believes <f>', 'a wants (j>\ etc. Once these CCPs are defined, the projection behavior of presuppositions originating with the complement sentence <j> is thereby determined. So what we must do is write definitions of the form (9).
(9) For any context c, c + a believes (/> is defined only if...
Where defined, c + a believes <j> = ...
Let us begin by recapitulating the standard possible worlds semantics of believe, as found, e.g., in Hintikka (1969) . A sentence like (10) (10) John believes that it is raining.
is true in a world w iff it is raining in every world w' that is doxastically accessible for John to w. What does 'doxastically accessible' mean? It means this: world w' is doxastically accessible for person x to world w iff w' is compatible with the beliefs that x holds in w. This familiar analysis is our starting point, and we now try to recast it faithfully in our context-change framework. First, a technical convenience: accessibility relations (binary relations among possible worlds) correspond one-to-one to accessibility assignments (functions from worlds to sets of worlds): 10 (11) Let R C W X W. Then f R is that function from W to^(W) such that, for any w e W, f R (w) -(w' e W: wRw').
For instance, to the relation of doxastic accessibility for John corresponds the following function Doxj ('Dox' for 'doxastic' and 'J' for 'John'):
(12) For any w e W, DoXj(w) -(w' e W: w' conforms to what John believes in w}.
The choice, has, of course, no substantive import, but we will save space in our CCP-definitions below by directly referring to these accessibility functions instead of the corresponding accessibility relations. Notice that the values of accessibility functions are the same kind of thing as contexts, namely sets of possible worlds, and as such are suitable arguments for the CCPs of sentencesa fact that will be exploited in our rules below. So how does the assertion of a belief-sentence like (10) affect the context? What information does it convey, what possibilities does it rule out? According to the standard analysis just sketched, (io) tells us about the world we are in that it is a world accessible from which (more precisely: doxastically accessible for John from which) are only worlds in which it is raining. In other words, (io) informs us that we are in a world w such that it rains in every element of Doxj(w). So the CCP of (io) has to be an instruction to eliminate from the original context all but the worlds which fulfill this condition on w. It must be this:
(i 3) For any c, c +John believes it is raining -{w e c: for every w' e Doxj(w), it is raining in w'}.
Now we must figure out how this CCP is determined compositionally, by the interaction of a general rule for structures of the form 'a believes 0' on the one hand and the CCP of the complement it is raining on the other. A first step towards isolating the contribution of each is to express the condition that it rains throughout Doxj(w) in terms which make explicit reference to the CCP of it is raining. It turns out (given (5) above) that the following equivalence holds:
(14) For any set X Q W: it is raining in every W'EX iff X + it is raining = X.
In other words, the sets of worlds throughout which it is raining are precisely those that map onto themselves under the CCP of it is raining. Why? Because if it is already raining in every element of a set of worlds X, then eliminating from X any non-rain-worlds won't change it. Whereas, if a set does become genuinely smaller by eliminating non-rain-worlds from it, then it must be a set which didn't already have rain throughout. Thus (13) becomes (15).
(15) For any c, c + John believes it is raining -(we c: DoXj(w) + /'/ is raining = Dox.(w)}.
From this it is easy to generalize to arbitrary complements (and subjects): The general format of this rule will recur elsewhere, and it will be more transparent if we use an abbreviation: if c is any context, <j> any LF, let 'c + <f> -same' express the condition that c + <j> -c. So we can render (16) as (17).
(17) For any c, c + a believes 0 -{w e c: Dox a (w) + <j> -same}. (12): 'Dox a (w) entails p' means nothing more and nothing less than that a believes p in w.) What we predict, then, is simply (a special case of) Karttunen's generalization: if <j> presupposes p, then a believes^ presupposes that a believes p. We thus expect to be able to account at least for the data that most directly supported Karttunen's view, e.g. the fact that a sequence of two belief reports in which the content of the complement of the first entails the presupposition of the complement of the second makes a smooth discourse with no presuppositions as a whole. Let us calculate through an example of this kind to see exactly how this works.
(19) John believes that Mary is here, and he believes that Susan is here too.
Before we can get started, I must fill in a brief sketch of my treatment of too. Relying on Kripke, 12 1 assume that too is implicitly deictic or anaphoric, sort of like in addition to x, where the intended reference of x is disambiguated at Logical Form by means of a referential index. In the salient construal of (19), for instance, too means 'in addition to Mary' and is therefore coindexed with Mary in the preceding clause. Also, too associates with focus, and this too is represented at LF, by means of the customary subscripted 'F'. 13 So the LF of (19), under the reading we want to consider, is (20).
(20) John believes that Mary, is here, and he believes that Susan F is here too,.
The general rule for the interpretation of too is (21).
Transposed into the context change framework and applied to the example at hand, this amounts to (22 For a contrasting case, where presupposition filtering does not occur and in fact the discourse is deviant, consider (25). 14 (25) John doubts that Mary, is here and/but believes that Susan F is here tooj.
That (25) doesn't make sense is predicted if we assume that doubt means (or at least implies) something like not believe. After the first conjunct in (25), we then have a context for all whose elements w Doxj(w) fails to entail Mary's being here. So not only is Doxj(w) + Susan is here too, not guaranteed for every such w to be defined, it is actually guaranteed to be undefined for all of them.
15
I don't mean to suggest that the present analysis is unique in providing an account of the unacceptability of (25). The same prediction is made by anyone who assumes every presupposition to be also an entailment of the minimal sentence that carries it. 16 Given this assumption, the two conjuncts of (25) simply have incompatible contents, and this suffices to explain the deviance. So it could at best be equivalent to the first half of (18), the definedness conditions (the part in brackets). But is it equivalent even to that? There is a superficial discrepancy: (18) requires the CCP of (j> to be defined for each of a set of contexts, namely all the Dox a (w) for each w?c, whereas (3), in effect, requires it to be defined for the single context B a (c). What is the relation between Karttunen's B a and our Dox a ? Karttunen defines B a (c) as the set of beliefs attributed to a in c. So, construed as a set of propositions, B a (c) -{p C W: c entails that a believes p}, or more explicitly: B a (c) -{p Q W: Vw e c: a believes p in w). Rewriting this in terms of the doxastic accessibility function: B a (c) -{p Q W: Vw e c: Dox a (w) Q p). Now if we form the set of worlds in which all the propositions in this set are true, what we get is U w <= c Dox a (w). In other words (abstracting away from extrinsic differences): whereas I required the CCP of (j> to be defined for each Dox a (w) for w e c, Karttunen required it to be defined for the union of them all. But to the extent that definedness of the CCP of </> for a context is a matter of that context entailing a certain proposition (as in the cases of interest, where (j> has a purely presuppositional CCP), 17 then the two requirements obviously come to the same thing: a proposition is entailed by each element of a set iff it is entailed by its union. So my proposal is not in conflict with Karttunen's, but can be seen as an elaboration of it.
18
Thus far, we are following in Karttunen's footsteps and, indeed, if we restrict our attention to verbs of belief, our predictions fully mirror his. But differences show up when we extend the same treatment to other attitudes, say to the desire verb want. According to the standard Hintikka-style analysis we took as a starting point, the rule for want should look just like that for believe, except with a different accessibility relation substituted. Here it is buletic accessibility that is relevant, so the pertinent accessibility function is Bulj: w -{w' e W: w' conforms to what John wants in w).
(27) [c + a wants 0 is defined iff Bul a (w) + (f> is defined for each w e c]
Where defined, c + a wants <j> -{w e c: Bul a (w) + </> = same).
The predictions implied by (27) In these examples, the presupposition originating with the last complement clause also gets 'filtered out': they are felicitous and require no initial presuppositions. (28) makes sense without committing the speaker to the assumption that Patrick believes he has or will ever have a cello, and (29) also doesn't presuppose that John believes Fred will come. 19 Karttunen's rule (3) fails to account for this, but (27) predicts it straightforwardly. In fact, (27) derives the following generalization: if </> presupposes p, then a wants<f> presupposes that a wants p. This is a welcome result for want-want sequences, but-and here comes the down side-it is not suited to capture the analogous filtering effect in believe-want sequences like our initial example (2) or (30) below.
(30) John believes that Mary, is coming, and he wants Susan F to come too,.
These were better taken care of with Karttunen's generalization that a wants 0 presupposes that a believes p.
DESIRE REPORTS AND COUNTERFACTUALITY
We just saw that the straightforward treatment of desire predicates in (27) fails to account for the ease with which a preceding belief-report can help satisfy the presuppositional requirement of the want -complement, as in (2) and (30). The problem is that the sets Dox a (w) and Bul a (w) (for a given w) may in principle stand in any relation whatsoever, i.e. they may be mutually disjoint, diey may overlap, one may be a subset of the other, or vice versa. After all, which worlds I deem desirable has nothing to do with which I consider candidates for actuality. So there is no way we can be sure, e.g., in the evaluation of (30), that just because all of John's belief-worlds have Mary coming in them, this should also be so in all his desire-worlds. Now it is no news to anybody who has thought about the semantics of want- 
A conditional semantics for desire verbs
The analysis of desire verbs I want to pursue here is sketched in Stalnaker (1984: 89) : 'wanting something is preferring it to certain relevant alternatives, the relevant alternatives being those possibilities that the agent believes will be realized if he does not get what he wants.' An important feature of this analysis is that it sees a hidden conditional in every desire report. A little more explicitly, the leading intuition is that John wants you to leave means that John thinks that if you leave he will be in a more desirable world than if you don't leave. The main task in implementing this idea is to spell out the conditionals in the above paraphrase. For this I employ a version of the semantics that Lewis (1973) proposed for counterfactual conditionals and Stalnaker (1968) for conditionals in general. 20 The key concept here is that of comparative similarity among worlds, and the basic idea is that a conditional if<f>, xp is true in a world w iff yj is true in all 0-worlds maximally similar to w. (By a '0 -world maximally similar to w', we mean a world in which <j> is true and which resembles w no less than any other world where <f> is true.) The meaning ofwant, as indicated by the paraphrase above, can now be described as follows:
(31) 'a wantsij)' 1 is true in w iff for every w' e Dox a (w): every ^-world maximally similar to w' is more desirable to a in w than any non-^ -world maximally similar to w'.
(31) instructs us, for every belief-world, to compare the set of its closest <j>-alternatives to the set of its closest non-^-alternatives. In effect, however, one of these two sets of'alternatives' will always be the singleton of just w' itself: if^ is true in w', it is the former set, otherwise the latter. So another way of stating these truthconditions is in the following disjunctive form: For every belief world w', either <j> is true in w' and w' is more desirable than its closest non-^-alternatives, or else <j> is false in w' and w' is less desirable than its closest <f>-alternatives. When a sentence like / want you to call me on Monday is used, there typically are doxastic alternatives where you do call me on Monday as well as those where you don't. For it to be true, then, each of the former must be more desirable than minimally different ones where you don't call, and each of the latter less desirable than minimally different ones where you do.
Independently of my present concern with presupposition projection, what motivation is there for this semantic analysis? In what respects is it more successful than the primitive treatment in (27)? First, the new rule, unlike the old, no longer predicts that when <f> entails rp, a wants <j> therefore entails a wants xp. This is welcome in light of certain intuitively fallacious instances of this inference pattern. Here is an example I owe to Asher (1987) : imagine that Nicholas is not willing to pay the $3,000 that he believes it would cost him if he flew to Paris on the Concorde, but he would love to fly on the Concorde if he could get the trip for free. Under these circumstances (32a) is true, yet (32b) is false, despite the fact that taking a free trip on the Concorde, of course, implies taking a trip on the Concorde.
(32) (a) Nicholas wants a free trip on the Concorde, (b) Nicholas wants a trip on the Concorde.
The prediction of our rule (31) conforms to Asher's intuition: (32b) is false because many of Nicholas's doxastic alternatives in which he flies on the Concorde (in fact, all to which he assigns a high degree of subjective probability) are such that he flies for $3,000 there and is therefore worse off than in minimally differing worlds where he doesn't fly at all. Yet this does not prevent (32a) from being true: those (relatively unlikely) belief-worlds where he does get a free trip are better than similar worlds where he doesn't, and the other (more likely) belief-worlds, where he doesn't fly, or flies and pays, are each worse than otherwise similar free-ride-worlds. Stalnaker (1984: 89) discusses a different type of counterexample to the same inference pattern:
21 'Suppose I am sick I want to get well. But getting well entails having been sick, and I do not want to have been sick. Suppose there was a murder. I want to know who committed the murder. But my knowing who committed the murder entails that the murder was committed, and I never wanted the murder to have been committed.' These fallacious inferences, too, would have been validated by the old rule (27): if I get well in all the worlds that conform to my desires, then I have been sick in all the worlds that conform to my desires.
What does the new rule (31) predict for these examples? We would like to show that it allows for the premise, / want to get well, to be true and the conclusion, / want to have been sick, to be false at the same time. Here is how this can be. There are basically three kinds of worlds: w,, where I am healthy all the time; w 2 , where I am sick first and then get well; and w 3 , where I am sick and stay sick. In terms of their desirability to me in the actual world w 0 , they are ordered as follows: w t is better than w 2 , which is better than w 3 . My beliefs in w 0 are such that I believe that I have been sick, i.e., w 2 , w 3 e Dox t (w 0 ) but w, i Dox,(w 0 ). Now in w 2 1 get well and the closest world where I don't is w 3 , which is less desirable. And in w 3 ,1 don't get well and the closest world where I do is w 2 , which is more desirable. Hence I want to get well is true in w 0 . On the other hand, in both w 2 and w 3 1 have been sick, but these are not better (rather: worse) than the closest world, w,, where I haven't been. So I want to have been sick is false in w 0 .
For a related point, consider a statement like (3 3).
(33) I want to teach Tuesdays and Thursdays next semester.
Suppose this sentence is intuitively true as spoken by me today. Is it therefore the case, as the old rule (27) would have it, that I teach Tuesdays and Thursdays next semester in all the worlds that are compatible with everything I desire? No. In worlds that are compatible with everything I desire I actually don't teach at all. But if this is so, (27) predicts (33) to be false, and likewise for the majority of want-sentences that we accept as true in everyday conversation. Rule (31) has no such problem: as it happens, I believe that I will teach (a regular course load) next semester. This means there are no doxastically accessible worlds in which I don't teach at all. In all doxastically accessible worlds, I either teach Tuesdays and Thursdays, or else I teach the same load on different weekdays. Among these, the former are more desirable than the latter, and this makes (33) true by (30-
CCP and presupposition projection
Supposing that the analysis of desire reports in (31) is on the right track, what form will it take in context change semantics? Let me approach this question via a detour and look first at the CCP of indicative conditional statements.
Excursion: context change with indicative conditionals
First, a few technical devices and abbreviations. The relation of comparative similariry among worlds can be encoded by a family of selection functions; for each world w, there is a selection function Sim^, from propositions to propositions which maps each p to the set of p-worlds maximally similar to w:
(34) Simjp): -{w' e W: w' e p and w' resembles w no less than any other world in p)
In a truthconditional semantics, where each sentence </> expresses a proposition ], the semantic rule for conditionals can now be stated as follows:
When we try to transpose this into the context change framework, the main hurdle is to find a proposition that will serve as the argument for the selection function. We can't just make reference to 'the proposition expressed by </>'; rather, we get a proposition only by applying the CCP of <f> to some argument. What should that argument be? An often voiced intuition is that it is the main context, i.e., the input context to the CCP of the whole conditional. Compare, e.g., Stalnaker (1975: 276) So it is not (or at least not necessarily) a property of the similarity relation that leads us to consider worlds with John added to Mary rather than worlds where he replaces her. Rather, it seems to be due to the fact that, in evaluating this conditional, the selection function must apply to a proposition that retains all the information in c along with that contributed by the antecedent. Rule (36) guarantees this.
(36) also makes welcome predictions about presupposition projection in conditionals. In particular, it directly derives the familiar generalization 23 that conditionals inherit the presuppositions of their antecedents. In our terms: unless c + <f> is defined, c + if</>, xp won't be either. And it also derives the fact that presuppositions of the consequent which are entailed by the antecedent get 'filtered out'. (This is because the CCP of xp is applied to Sim w (c + <f>) and this, by the general definition of selection functions, is a subset of c + (f> .) Apart from the notation employed in the previous section, this uses an abbreviation for the ranking of possible worlds in terms of desirability. < a w is meant to be primarily a relation between worlds (defined in (38a)), but it is employed in (37) in an extended sense (defined in (38b)), as a relation between sets of worlds.
(38) (a) For any w, w', w" e W, w' < a w w" iff w' is more desirable to a in w than w". (b) ForanyweW,XCW,YCW, X < aw Y iff w' < aw w" for all w' e X, w" e Y.
Once again, the main hurdle in transposing (37) into the context change framework is to find propositions for Sim^-to apply to that will take the place of [[^] ] and W\ [[0] ] in (37) respectively. This time, the w' on which the selection functions Sirn^,. are based are all drawn from Dox a (w), so this set is a natural choice to take the place of c in (36) if we want to make the rules analogous. So I propose (39).
(39) c + a wants<j> -{w e c: for every w' e Dox a (w):
(Where Dox a (w) + not <j> is, of course, defined as Dox a (w)\Dox a (w) + </>) (39) implies that all the desirability comparisons that enter into determining the truth of a u/a«f-sentence are entirely among the subject's belief worlds. If a belief world w' has <j> true in it, it must be more desirable than otherwise similar belief worlds where <f> is false, and if a belief world has <f> false in it, then it must be less desirable than otherwise similar belief worlds where (j> is true. The desirability of non-belief-worlds never has any bearing on the truth of a want -report. We will see shortly that this may be an excessively strong claim. But let us suppose it is correct for the moment and examine the implications of rule (39) for presupposition projection. Not surprisingly at this point, (39) straightforwardly predicts Karttunen's generalization: the presuppositions of a wants (/> are satisfied just in case the subject a is presupposed to believe the presuppositions of the complement <f>. Let's calculate quickly through an illustrating example. To be shown: (30) as a whole presupposes nothing, in other words, c + (30) is defined regardless of the choice of c. The first part of the proof parallels the one regarding (20) in the section on belief reports: we establish that c +John believes Mary, is here (-: c') is well defined for all c and equals (w e c: Mary is here in all w' e Doxj(w)} (see (24) above). It remains to demonstrate the definedness of c' + he wants Susan F to be here too,. By (39), we must show that Doxj(w) + Susan F to be here too, and Doxj(w) + not [Susarip to be here too,] are defined for all w^c', which (by the notrule (8) and the foo-rule (21)) means that, for each w e c', Mary is here in all w' e Doxj(w). But this we have just shown.
Amendments
As it stands, the context change version (39) of our analysis of want loses one of the welcome predictions of the truthconditional version in (31). Recall again Stalnaker's concern with blocking the inference from Iwant to get well to I want to have been sick (and from / want to know who committed the murder to / want the murder to have been committed). I showed above how (31) made the premise true and the conclusion false because I believe that I have been sick. In the same scenario, (39) unfortunately predicts the conclusion to be trivially true instead of false. If I believe in w that I have been sick, then Doxj(w) + not [PRO to have been sick] is empty, and so is Sinv applied to it. Since it is trivially true that all the worlds in the empty set are worse than any others, this suffices to make the conclusion true. Stating the problem more generally, (39) predicts that, whenever a believes (f> or believes not <j>, it trivially follows that both a wants <f> and wants not</>.
A natural move to prevent these trivial truths is to make all selection functions undefined for the impossible proposition. 25 In other words, amend (34) above to (40) below.
(40) p is in the domain of Sirn^ only if p / 0; where defined, Sirn^,^): -{w' 6 W: w' e p and w' resembles w no less than any other world in p)
With (40), (39) implies, in effect, that twinf-sentences have an additional presupposition (above and beyond those projected from the complement according to Karttunen's generalization), namely that the subject does not believe the complement nor its negation. More formally, c + a wants $ will be undefined whenever Dox a (w) + <f> -0 or Dox a (w) + <f> -Dox o (w). Regarding Stalnaker's fallacious inferences, (39) still doesn't predict the same as (31). When the premise is true, (31) allowed the conclusion to be downright false; (39) only allows it to be a presupposition failure. This disagrees with Stalnaker's stated judgment, but for his examples, at least, I think it is quite defensible. / want to have been sick (as well as / want not to have been sick, or its more colloquial Neg-Raising variant I don't want to have been sick) is a strange sentence indeed to use for someone who takes for granted that she has been sick. 26 One would much rather say / am glad that I have been sick or some such thing, with a /active desire predicate. Stalnaker too spontaneously avoids want as he further comments on the murder-example: 'Given that there was a murder, I would rather know who committed it than not know. The question of whether or not I look with favor on the fact that there was a murder-whether I am glad that it happened or wish that it had not-does not arise in that context ' (1984: 89; emphases added) . (This raises the question of how these other desire-predicates differ from want, which I will take up below.) 27 Still, even if you agree that Stalnaker's examples are appropriately classified as infelicitous rather than false, it doesn't seem right that one can never speak of wanting things one is convinced will happen or convinced won't happen. (41), for instance, certainly does not suggest in any way that John has the slightest doubt about where he will be tonight, nor do we have difficulty making sense of utterances like (42).
(41) (John hired a babysitter because) he wants to go to the movies tonight. (42) I want this weekend to last forever. (But I know, of course, that it will be over in a few hours.)
These observations are a serious threat to the present analysis, and I am persuaded at least by (41) (44) Patrick intends to sell his cello (right now). This is certainly plausible for the example at hand, and I hope that a closer look at the data will bear it out in general. 29 Returning now to want and example (41), I suggest that want has a reading more or less equivalent to intend and this is what we witness here. Probably this is not really an ambiguity but indicates a broader sort of vagueness. But this question is just one of numerous loose ends that I am leaving here.
What about (42)? I am even less sure how to respond to this example. One strategy might be similar to the one I just took with (41): maybe for some reason not all the subject's beliefs are taken into account here either, but only a subset too weak to imply that Monday is right around the corner. Alternatively, (42) might be seen as reporting the attitudes of a mildly split personality. 30 The reasonable part of me knows and is resigned to the fact that rime passes, but the primitive creature of passion has lost sight of it. Another loose end.
Further predictions about presupposition filtering
Rule (39) captures Karttunen's generalization so 'well' that it also shares its more dubious and downright inadequate predictions. As for the latter, (39) loses the one thing that was nice about (27), namely the prediction that presuppositions are filtered in want-want-sequences, such as (28) and (29) (repeated here).
(29) John wants Fred, to come, and he wants Jim F to come too,.
Supposing that (as the felicity of the first conjunct requires, by our present analysis) the possibility of Fred not coming is compatible with John's beliefs, the CCP of the second conjunct is not defined for its context. I have no solution to this important problem. All I can do is point out that under the present perspective it falls together with an analogous type of counterexample to Karttunen's generalization about conditionals.
31 (4s) is likewise fully acceptable, though predicted a presupposition failure by rule (36).
(45) If Mary, comes, we'll have a quorum. If Susan F comes too,, we'll have a majority.
The only way to treat this case-and thus the analogous one in (29)-that I know of is by invoking accommodation of an inexplicit restriction. 32 Once this mechanism is invoked, of course, the question arises to what extent it could also have been employed to yield some of the predictions that I took pains to make follow directly from the CCP definitions.
33 A serious exploration of this alternative must await another occasion.
Another prediction shared with Karttunen's original proposal is worth noting: the order of believe and want is not interchangeable if we want the presupposition of the second complement to get filtered. While (2) presupposes nothing, the same is not predicted for (46).
(46) Patrick wants me to buy him a cello, although he believes that his cello is going to take up a lot of space.
Does intuitive judgment bear this prediction out? Not strikingly so, but (46) does seem a bit less good than (2) or (28). The same pattern shows up in the following judgments from Asher (1987) (the judgments pertain to the possibility of an anaphoric reading for it while the intended antecedent (a car, a Porsche) has narrow scope with respect to the first attitude verb):
(47) (a) Fred believes that his wife will buy him a car. He hopes that it will be a Porsche. (b) ?Fred hopes that he will get a Porsche. He believes that his wife will buy it for him. (c) *John wants to have a Porsche. He believes his mother will buy it for him.
Supposing that the pronouns on the intended anaphoric readings would be E-Type pronouns, equivalent to the definite descriptions the car his wife will buy him, the Porsche he will get [have) , the acceptability of these pronouns turns on the satisfaction of the corresponding definite description's presuppositions. In this light, (47a-c) support our prediction. On the other hand, Asher accepts (48), and Cresswell (1988) offers (49).
(48) John wants a woman to marry him. He believes he can make her happy.
(49) Susan wants a pet. She believes she will look after it.
Both authors comment that the meaning of the believe -complement here is an implicit conditional: John believes that, if a woman marries him, he can make her happy, and Susan believes that, if she gets a pet, she will look after it. So once again, we must invoke accommodation (modal subordination). I would like to note, however, that certain examples of an analogous form do seem to fit transparently with our (i.e., Karttunen's) analysis. Suppose I had to miss the last set of the Wimbledon women's final because of a hairdresser's appointment, so I don't know who won, though I do know the game is over and decided by now. In such a situation, I might say (50) (50) I want Gabriela to have won.
However, it would be strange to continue as in (51), even though-in analogy with the examples above-this should be just another way of saying that I am convinced that Steffi cried rf Gabriela won.
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(51) *... and I am sure that it made Steffi cry hard.
So there do seem to be some limitations (however obscure) on the availability of accommodated restrictions and, when these apply, the workings of the CCPs themselves are seen more directly and tend to confirm the present approach.
Counterfactual and/active desire predicates
W-'am-sentences are felicitous in contexts where it has already been established that the subject believes the presuppositions of its complement. Hence the naturalness of sequences like (2) and (30). Our current analysis suggests that this is so because of a fact about the meaning of want: want-sentences are interpreted with respect to a doxastic modal base: to want <f> means to find the 0-worlds among the worlds compatible with one's beliefs more desirable than comparable non-0 -worlds compatible with one's beliefs. Thus the truth of a twwf-sentence never turns on the desirability of any worlds which contradict the subject's beliefs. Therefore, if only such non-belief-worlds violate the presuppositions of <f>, we can be guaranteed that we won't need to consider them in evaluating a wants<j>.
Apart from the subtler doubts we already raised above, there is a rather obvious reason why this explanation cannot be right. If we consider a wider range of desire predicates, we find that the majority of them do not require or even permit such doxastic modal bases. This is particularly clear in an example like (52), where the use of wish with the irrealis mood 35 suggests strongly that John is pessimistic, perhaps that he is even certain he won't teach Tuesdays.
(52) John wishes he would teach on Tuesdays.
(52) cannot be analyzed as meaning that John teaches on Tuesdays in his most desirable belief-worlds; to the contrary, it suggests that he doesn't teach on Tuesdays in any of his belief worlds. Nevertheless, presuppositions triggered in the complements of wish-sentences appear to be satisfied by previous believesentences. (53) is just as felicitous as (30).
(53) John believes that Mary, is the only one here, and he wishes Susan F were here too,.
If we did insist on interpreting wish here with a doxastic modal base, i.e., followed essentially our rule for want from above, we could not provide an adequate interpretation for (53): after processing the believe -sentence, we would have a context c such that for all its elements w, Doxj(w) entails that Mary is here and nobody else is. According to rule (39) with amendment (40), c' + he wishes Susan F were here too, would then always be undefined. This is because DoXj(w) + Susan F were here too, is empty for all w e c', and thus not in the domain of Sim^,. 36 In short, (39) would predict the second sentence of (53) to be inappropriate whenever the first has been accepted, and this is clearly wrong. Counterfactual desire reports like those involving wish + irrealis complement are not the only ones that create problems. Our present analysis of want also fails to generalize to the /active members in the family of desire predicates. Consider (54).
(54) John is glad he will teach on Tuesdays.
The predicate be glad, like all factive desire predicates, introduces a presupposition to the effect that the subject believes in the truth of its complement. 37 Again, this trivializes the truthconditions that would be predicted for (54) if we simply used the same rule (39) as for want. This rime, it is the set to the right of < a w that is automatically undefined. Again, that's evidently wrong. Here, too, the intuitive source of the problem is that (39) excludes all doxasrically inaccessible worlds from consideration. Evidently, one cannot assess the truth of a is glad that<j> without reference to facts about the desirability of certain non-^-worlds, and thereby of certain non-belief-worlds. But then it becomes mysterious again why the presuppositions of <j> (if any) need only be satisfied in the belief-worlds, as the felicity of (55) indicates.
(55) John, thought he, was late and was glad thatBill F was late too,.
Consideration of such an extended range of desire predicates suggests that our current analysis of want constitutes at best a special case. How come, then, the facts about presupposition projection are exactly the same for those other desire predicates as for want? Not only does a preceding belief-sentence satisfy the presuppositions of the subsequent desire-complement: (56a,b) presuppose nothing as a whole; but we also spontaneously accommodate the assumption that the subject believes the presupposition when we hear (57a,b) out of context. If the modal base for these verbs is not doxasric, then why should the presuppositions of their complements be satisfied just because the subject is known to believe them? We have no guarantee of this.
Excursion: counterfactual conditionals
It is instructive to see that a similar dilemma arises with presuppositions in the antecedents of counterfactual conditionals. We couldn't just use the same rule (36) for them that we gave above for indicative conditionals, because their antecedents are typically inconsistent with the common ground and they would thus come out undefined. But what should we use instead of c in (36) to apply the CCP of (j> to? Most discussions of counterfactuals in the literature suggest that it should just be W, i.e., a context devoid of all information. 38 That way, the CCP for subjunctive conditionals would be as in (58). (58) 
Back to wish and be glad
I want to propose that wish and be glad have the same core semantics as want, but there is a difference that is analogous to that between indicative and subjunctive conditionals. To get the intuitive idea, recall our initial conditional paraphrase for John wants you to leave: John thinks that if you leave he will be in a more desirable world than if you don't leave. If we try to construct similar paraphrases for sentences with wish and be glad, here is how they come out: John wishes you were gone means John thinks that if you were gone he would be in a more desirable world than he is in because you are not gone'. John isgladyou are gone means 'John thinks that because you are gone he is in a more desirable world than he would be in if you were not gone.' The common pattern is apparent, and the differences are in the choice of indicative vs. subjunctive mood and of if vs. The paraphrase of the ^W-sentence, on the other hand, has the counterfactual on the opposite side of 'more desirable than', so this is where we should substitute rev (} (Dox a (w)) for Dox a (w) in (39). And because of factivity, i.e., the fact that a's beliefs can be assumed to entail <j>, we can this rime simplify the left side. The result is (65).
(65) c + a is glad <f> -(w e c: for every w' e Dox a (w): w' < a w Sim w (rev j ,(Dox a (w)) + not<j>))
Presupposition projection from the complements of wish and be glad sentences, of course, works as desired now. (64) and (65) both imply (by reasoning parallel to that above) that the CCPs of a wishes/is glad </> will be defined for an initial context c iff Dox a (w) + <j> is defined for all w e c-Karttunen's generalization. Recall, e.g., our dilemma with (53). Our context c' after processing the believesentence was c' = {w: Mary and nobody else is here in all w' e Doxj(w)). For each such w^c', what can we say about rev SuMn _ f _^r f _,, m ._ (Doxj(w))? By definition of the revision process, this set is not so big as to include any world where Mary isn't here, and so we can be assured that the CCP o(Susan F were here too t is defined for it. The whole incrementation process thus goes through smoothly, and the presupposition filtering in (53) is accounted for.
WHY DO ATTITUDE VERBS APPEAR TO BE HOLES?
Why is it that a sentence like (66), uttered in isolation, seems to presuppose that it actually was raining, rather than merely that John believes so?
(66) John believes that it stopped raining.
Observations of this sort led Gazdar to conclude that attitude verbs are essentially holes (with apparent exceptions due to cancellation). 4 * For us as for Karttunen, they are filters (as a matter of their intrinsic semantics), and such hole-behavior is unexpected.
Let us be clear about what exactly the problem is. There is no dispute about the interpretation of (66) in contexts where it is presupposed that John believes it had been raining. This presupposition-as our analysis predicts and as everyone agrees-suffices to make (66) interpretable and nothing else is accommodated. What, however, if it isn't yet presupposed that John believes it was raining? Then something must be accommodated. What will this be? Our analysis as it stands, it would seem, leads us to expect the minimal accommodation required to make the sentence interpretable. This would be accommodation of the assumption that John believes it to have been raining. But in point of fact, we spontaneously accommodate something else, namely that it had in fact been raining.
So there is a prima facie discrepancy between the observed facts and our (Karttunen's) predictions. The purpose of this section is to consider some independent factors on which we might blame these facts without abandoning our basic analysis. I will consider two hypotheses in particular: 47 first, that all cases where attitude verbs seem to be holes result from de re construals of (a constituent containing) the presupposition trigger. Second, a version of Karttunen's 'spill-over' story cited in the introduction.
De re readings
If a presupposition trigger in the complement clause is not really interpreted in the scope of the attitude verb, then it will be unsurprising on any theory that the relevant presupposition must be satisfied or accommodated in the main context. Take, for instance, the existence and uniqueness presupposition associated with the italicized definite description in (67).
(67) John thought that the person who was going to kill him had come to read the gas meter.
In the salient reading of (67), this definite is interpreted de re. Analyses of this phenomenon vary, but somehow or other they all imply that it is the speaker of (67), not John, who is 'responsible' for the definite description. For concreteness, assume a Quine-Kaplan-Lewis analysis of de re reports along the following lines.
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(68) There is an acquaintance relation D such that (i) John bore D to the person who was going to kill him, and (ii) John thought that whoever he bore D to had come to read the gas meter.
However this is implemented in detail, the definite description is outside the attitude complement in this paraphrase, and it is only to be expected that its presupposition must be entailed by the common ground. Nothing is asserted or presupposed about whether John believes there is somebody that will kill him.
(The invited inference here is, of course, that he lacks this belief, but the sentence itself doesn't say one way or the other.) Now it is quite uncontroversial that some cases of apparent presupposition inheritance from an attitude complement-such as in this salient reading of (67)-should be explained away in this manner. But would it be plausible to speculate that all presuppositions that percolate to the top from what seems to be a complement-internal trigger are really riding piggy-back on a de re construal of their trigger (or an expression containing it)? There are at least two prima facie obstacles to such a claim. First, the notion of a de re reading does not so obviously generalize to presupposition triggers other than definite descriptions. Second, one would be committed to the view that de re readings are ceteris paribus always preferred over de dicto readings, which contradicts superficial evidence. Let's take a closer look at each of these two points.
De re construals for other presupposition triggers?
When we move beyond definite descriptions, we have to clarify, on a case-bycase basis for each type of presupposition trigger, what a de re reading would even consist in. To the extent that the constructions in question can be analyzed as involving covert definite descriptions, this is relatively easy. 49 Take, e.g., the presuppositions of aspectual verbs like stop. Uncontroversial instances of de re readings like in (67) are harder to come by here, but they can be found if one looks. (69) John thought I had stopped proof-reading. By (69) I could conceivably mean that John thought of the activity of mine that was in fact a proof-reading, but that he may not have recognized as such, that it had stopped. For instance, John may have seen me from a distance and thought I was reading a magazine, then (after he had looked away) heard my step, at which point he concluded I must have stopped reading the magazine. In fact, I was proof-reading my article and continued doing this even as I was walking around. To be a true report about John's attitudes in this story, (69) would have to be represented along the following lines:
(70) There is an acquaintance relation D such that (i) John bore D to my proof-reading, and (ii) John thought that the activity he bore D to had stopped.
Here I have, in effect, treated the -/Mg-complement of stop as a definite description of a process. A verifying value for D in our scenario could be the relation that person x bears to activity y if x observed such and such visible manifestations of y (i.e., the visible manifestations of my proof-reading that John perceived when he looked). So analyzed, (69) evidently presupposes that I had in fact been proof-reading, and it doesn't presuppose that John thought I had been. But what about presupposition triggers like again, even, or the too in many of our examples throughout this article? What might it mean for an occurrence of one. of those to receive, or be part of a constituent that receives, a de re construal? Here is an example which might help us clarify this question and where such a construal might be independently motivated. Imagine two kids talking to each other on the phone: (71) John: I, am already in bed.
Mary: My parents think I F am alsoj in bed.
The point about example (71) is that it is quite clearly felicitous even if Mary's parents cannot be assumed to have any beliefs about John. Mary is not committed to the presupposition predicted by Karttunen, i.e., that her parents believe John to be in bed.
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I bring up this example here because it seems promising to try to account for its apparently exceptional projection behavior by analyzing Mary's utterance along the lines of a de re paraphrase like (72).
(72) Of the property of also being in bed, my parents think that I have it.
The idea behind this paraphrase is that 'the property of also being in bed' (more accurately here: 'the property of [PRO F also, being in bed]') is just another way of describing the property of being in bed, and that it is a description which fits that property only contingently: it is true of it just in case John happens to be in bed. And since the latter is a fact known to Mary but unknown to her parents, she, but not they, can describe it in those words. This would have to be worked out further, and I am not convinced it is the right approach to this type of example, 51 but it deserves consideration.
A general preference for de re readings?
Suppose we can overcome the first obstacle and posit plausible de re construals for all kinds of presupposition triggers. Would this amount to an alternative explanation of Gazdar's observation that when attitude reports with presuppositional complements are presented out of context, we always accommodate the presupposition in the main context? Not all by itself. We would have to defend the further claim that de re readings are ceterisparibus preferred wherever there is a choice between a de re and a de dicto construal. Without this assumption, we would merely predict that presuppositions sometimes percolate to the top, and we would expect this to correlate with independent clues in favor of a de re reading (such as the overall plausibility considerations that encourage us to flesh out the story in (67) in such a way that John is an unsuspecting murder victim). Now common wisdom certainly has it the other way round: dedicto readings are the unmarked choice. For one thing, this is what you'd expect under standard analyses relying on quantifying-in, polyadic homophones of the attitude verb, or another such special mechanism to generate the de re reading; de dicto readings are somehow simpler and conceptually prior on all these approaches. Moreover, it seems to be confirmed by intuitive judgment. For instance, what is the unmarked reading of (73)? (73) Does Ralph think that the man he saw at the beach is a spy?
Evidently the de dicto reading, because the spontaneous answer (given the facts of Quine's story) is: 'No, he thinks that the man he saw at the beach is a pillar of the community.'
Despite these initial deterrents, I think that a basic preference for de re readings may be defensible. Here is how. First, I propose a slight refinement of the standard de re analysis: 52 replace existential quantification over acquaintance relations by reference to a contextually salient particular acquaintance relation. For instance, (67) means (74) rather than (68).
(74) (i) John bore D to the person who was going to kill him, and
(ii) John thought that whoever he bore D had to come to read the gas meter, where D is the acquaintance relation supplied by the utterance context. Like all context-dependency, the selection of an appropriate acquaintance relation for the interpretation of a given utterance of a de re belief report depends on a miscellany of pragmatic factors. Sometimes general background knowledge plays the major part, as when we hear (67) and somehow guess that the intended D is the relation of visual contact between John and his killer as he lets him into the house. But it is plausible that the speaker's description of the res will usually be one important factor among others, and in the absence of other clues often the decisive one. This implies that, everything else being equal, the speaker's decision in (73) to refer to Ortcutt as 'the man Ralph saw at the beach' (rather than as 'Ortcutt' or 'the man he saw in the shadows') will bias the hearer towards the assumption that the intended acquaintance relation between Ralph and Ortcutt is the one established in the beach-encounter. And with this disambiguation, Ralph thinks the man he saw at the beach is a spy is false, even though read de re.
Another way of summarizing the suggestion I just made is this: there is not really just one de re reading (for a given constituent), but there are many-one for each acquaintance relation that the context might supply. And some of those many, namely those where the acquaintance relation happens to include the subject's awareness that the res fits the same description used by the speaker, are very similar to the de dicto reading: more precisely, they entail it. In a way, I am blurring the distinction between de re and de dicto readings. But that may not be such a bad thing. 53 More often than not, the two are impossible to tell apart in practice anyway. When we hear somebody say that John thinks his dog is sick, do we understand that John takes himself to be in a world where the dog he has there is sick, or do we rather understand that John ascribes illness to his dog under some acquaintance relation or other? Under ordinary circumstances, where people know whether they own dogs, are acquainted with their dogs, and rarely encounter them unrecognizably disguised, one is true of John just in case the other is. So we couldn't really tell whether we construe the utterance de dicto and infer the truth of a de re reading, or the other way round. The present proposal, which implies that the unmarked reading is a de re reading that entails the de dicto reading, is equally compatible with our intuitions about those ordinary cases. And it also accounts for (73), where it looked at first like we
This is all very sketchy. I am not yet ready to really endorse the view that de re construals are ceteris paribus preferred wherever possible, and that all presupposition inheritance from the complements of attitude verbs is due to this preference. But I think it is not a hopeless line to pursue. In the next section, I sketch an alternative which likewise strikes me as promising, and I will not attempt to choose at this point.
Other people's beliefs and the nature of accommodation
Recall the problem as we stated it with respect to sentence (66). When this sentence is uttered in a context where it isn't yet presupposed that John believes it had been raining, then we spontaneously accommodate the presupposition that it had (in fact) been raining. Suppose (in distinction to the alternative hypothesis of the preceding section) that the LF of (66) is what it appears to be, with the presupposition trigger genuinely in the scope of believe. And suppose further our account of the CCP of (66) is correct, i.e., it is defined exactly for those contexts in which it is presupposed that John believes it had been raining. Then we have a double puzzle of sorts: accommodating the presupposition that it had in fact been raining is predicted to be neither necessary nor sufficient to turn the context into one for which the CCP of (66) is defined. Yet, in practice it seems to be sufficient as well as highly preferred (if perhaps not downright necessary). Why?
Part of the answer, if our analysis is at all to be saved, has to be that we actually accommodate at once both the presupposition that it has been raining and the presupposition that John believes so. For without the latter, the CCP of (66) just wouldn't be defined. This is consistent with intuitive judgment in so far as we certainly wind up assuming that John believes so when we accept (66).
54 So the puzzle can be restated this way: why is it somehow easier to accommodate both that it rained and that John thought so at once, than to accommodate the latter alone?
It is useful here to recall a general point about accommodation: 55 assumptions to be accommodated are supposed to be uncontroversial and unsurprising. One may explicitly assert controversial and surprising things (in fact, one should), but to expect one's audience to accept them by way of accommodation is not good conversational practice. So when we hear (66) out of the blue, we know two things: first, as a matter of the semantics of this sentence, we know that it requires the presupposition that John believes it was raining. Second, we know that the speaker takes this to be uncontroversial and unsurprising. Now why would it be unsurprising that John has such a belief? The most natural guess is that it would be unsurprising because it was in fact raining and John was in an appropriate position to find out. Of course, these are not the only possible conditions under which someone might form a belief that it was raining; but they are the most normal conditions. Therefore, if accommodation is generally accompanied by a suggestion of unsurprisingness, then it is not so puzzling that these are the conditions which we spontaneously imagine to obtain. (This, I think, is what Karttunen had in mind in the passage I quoted in the Introduction.) Again, I am not confident that this is the right story, but it is prima facie plausible, and it gives us another way of maintaining our semantic analysis in spite of superficial appearances that attitude reports inherit the presuppositions of their complements.
CONCLUSION
Karttunen (i 974:18 8), having classified complementizable verbs into a number of subgroups according to their permeability for presuppositions of their complements, wrote: 'These distinctions are of course not arbitrary but presumably follow from the semantics of verb complementation in some manner yet to be explained.' What sort of an explanation was he hoping for? Presumably the kind that Stalnaker (1974, 1985, and elsewhere) proposed explicitly for the connective and and sketched for conditionals and belief-predicates. In the case of and, this was a simple and satisfying explanation indeed (1974: 210- 
11):
Karttunen defends the following [generalization]:... the presuppositions of a conjunction are the presuppositions required by either of the conjuncts, minus any required by the second conjunct which are entailed by the first ... we can explain [this] generalization without postulating ad hoc semantic or pragmatic rules. The explanation goes like this:... when a speaker says something of the form A and B, he may take it for granted that A ... after he has said it. The proposition that A will be added to the background of common assumptions before the speaker asserts that B. Now suppose that B expresses a proposition that would, for some reason, be inappropriate to assert except in a context where A, or something entailed by A, is presupposed. Even if A is not presupposed initially, one may still assert A andB since by the time one gets to saying that B, the context has shifted, and it is by then presupposed that A.
The mere commonplace that asserting <j> and ip consists of asserting first <j> and then \j> was sufficient to explain presupposition projection in conjunctions. In our terminology: one naive look at and reveals what its CCP is and that this CCP makes the correct predictions.
That, of course, was an exceptionally easy case. Already the case of the conditional is much less obvious, notwithstanding Stalnaker's optimism in the following passage (1974:211):
The analogous generalization about conditional statements is explainable on equally simple assumptions. Here we need first the assumption that what is explicitly supposed becomes (temporarily) a part of the background of common assumptions in subsequent conversation, and second that an if clause is an explicit supposition. Again, Karttunen's generalization is derived from these obvious assumptions.
What exactly is the role of supposing the antecedent in the overall context change, i.e., why is it necessary to do so in order to calculate the information conveyed by the whole conditional? What does this supposing amount to when the conditional is a counterfactual? What else happens after the supposition of the antecedent, in particular, what do we do with the consequent? In short, unlike the earlier story about and, this description of the CCP of if leaves a lot unsaid, and it is not so immediately evident how it should be completed in such a way that it predicts both the informational content of conditionals and their presuppositions. The following description of the CCP of believe, though still not complete, 56 is more nearly so (Stalnaker H What Phoebe believes, or is assumed to believe, may be different from, or incompatible with, what a speaker talking about Phoebe's beliefs believes or assumes. The relevant derived context will be ... the set of all possible situations that might, for all the speaker presupposes, be compatible with Phoebe's beliefs. This set of possible situations is the derived context for interpreting the clauses that are intended to express the contents of Phoebe's beliefs ... All of the ways that ordinary contextual information constrains and guides the interpretation of assertions... will also be ways in which derived contexts constrain and guide the interpretation of embedded sentences which ascribe or deny beliefs . . . [for example], presupposition requirements: Just as 'Harry regrets accepting the bribe' is appropriate only in a context in which it is presupposed that a bribe was offered, and that Harry accepted it, so the statement 'Phoebe believes that Harry regrets accepting the bribe' requires a derived context in which it is presupposed that a bribe was offered and Harry accepted it. That is to say, it must be presupposed-taken by the speaker to be common ground-that Phoebe believes that a bribe was offered, and that Harry accepted it.
But numerous questions arise here as well when we try to extrapolate to other attitude verbs. Well, I tried to complete these sketches, and it turned out to be harder than I thought. I had to set my sights low and got around only to two or three of the many verb types that Karttunen included in the classification referred to above. Even with those two or three, I barely scratched the surface and left many open problems and dangling stipulations. I set out to support the hypothesis that all presupposition projection was just a by-product of an independently plausible account of context change. I don't know if I have done more to support it than to cast doubt on it, but at least I have given it more concrete shape.
all possible situations that might, for all the speaker presupposes, be compatible with Phoebe's beliefs. This set of possible situations is the derived context for interpreting the clauses that are intended to express the contents of Phoebe's beliefs.' But Stalnaker also does not give a rule that actually specifies the outcome of the context change effected by a beliefsentence. As far as I can see, one cannot write such a rule without referring to the individual sets Dox a (w) rather than just to their union. 19 The significance of this type of counterexamples to Karttunen is heightened by the fact that it seems to support Gazdar: his mechanism of cancellation by a conflicting conversational implicature covers (28) along with (2). 20 My version here is actually a cross between the two authors' versions. I depart from Lewis in making the Limit Assumption, but I don't make what Lewis calls Stalnaker's Assumption. In other words, I assume that for each world w and each contingent proposition p there is a non-empty set of p-worlds which are maximally similar to w, but this need not be a singleton. Evidently, it is important either to justify these choices or show that my aims in this paper do not really depend on them. I must leave both to future work. 21 Similar examples were also discussed by Janet Dean Fodor (1979) . 22 Stalnaker goes right on to say that this is a specific property of indicative, as opposed to subjunctive, conditionals. See below. 23 See, e.g., Karttunen (1973a Karttunen ( , 1974 Taking that into account, we would have: for any w e W, time t, F a (w, t) -{w' e W: w' is compatible with everything that a in w at t believes to be the case no matter how he chooses to act after t). 29 There is a problem: Patrick intends to sell his cello tomorrow is predicted to presuppose that he will have a cello tomorrow no matter how he acts. But he could have decided to sell it today, in which case he wouldn't have one tomorrow anymore. This must be fixed somehow by restricting the relevant actions to those at or after the reference time of the complement.
30 Cf. Lewis (1986: 34-5 Roberts (1989 Roberts ( , 1991 . 3 3 This is, in effect, the proposal of Cresswell (1988 35 What I mean here by the 'irrealis mood' is, in morphological terms, homophonous with the past tense, except for the 1st and 3rd persons singular of the verb be, whose irrealis forms are were rather than was. It seems to be the same mood that shows up in the antecedent of counterfactual conditionals. Wherever I refer to the verb wish from now, I mean the wish that governs a tensed complement clause in the irrealis. (As opposed to, say, wish + infinitive, which I disregard here.) The irrealis mood itself (i.e., the suffix of non-concatenative morpheme that realizes it on the embedded verb) will receive no semantic interpretation at all; I treat it as a mere surface phenomenon (analogous to, say, case on an NP), and only the superordinate verb that governs it is a semantic unit. (Likewise, the mood marking in the antecedent of a counterfactual conditional is semantically redundant; only the counterfactual modal-would or might-in the consequent is interpreted.) I don't thereby mean to deny, of course, that the lexical items which govern the irrealis mood form a natural semantic class.
36 An alternative might be to undo the amendment in (40) and return to (34). Then c' + he wishes Susan F were here too, would always be c' again. Still, the truthcondirions for (53) would be trivialized, so this is not a way out. 37 By the usual definition of factivity, it moreover presupposes that the complement is in fact true (not just believed to be so by the subject)-though some have argued against that stronger presupposition on the grounds that one can say things like: Mary, who was under the illusion that it was Sunday, was glad that she could stay in bed (Klein 1975 , as cited in Gazdar (1979: 122) ). What matters here is only the assumption that a is glad that <j> presupposes at least that a believes <j>, which has not, to my knowledge, been disputed.
38 For instance, Kratzer (1981: 69) proposes that the modal base for counterfactual conditionals is 'empty'. 39 Except perhaps by way of local accommodation in the sense of Heim (1983) . 40 An alternative assumption would be that it is just some context within these limits, and other contextual clues determine which particular one it is for each given utterance of a counterfactual conditional. This would then be yet another source of vagueness, on top of that already due to the flexibility of criteria for similarity. I don't see at this point how this option 2i 8 Presupposition Projection and the Semantics of Attitude Verbs could be empirically distinguished from the one adopted in the text. 41 As David Dowty (personal communication) reminded me, (62) and (36) do not predict that we must use a subjunctive conditional when the antecedent is presupposed to be false and an indicative one otherwise. A closer look reveals that we predict one direction of this generalization: if the antecedent is incompatible with the common ground, the indicative conditional is infelicitous and only the subjunctive one is permitted. (This follows because of the amendment in (40), which makes the selection function undefined for the inconsistent proposition.) On the other hand, nothing I have said so far implies that one couldn't use the subjunctive conditional even when the antecedent is compatible with the common ground. Interestingly, there are some cases where this systematically occurs; see Karttunen & Peters (1979) and especially Stalnaker (1975) for examples. But it is not an option that is always freely available, and to capture this we must impose an additional felicity condition on the choice of the counterfactual. A rough proposal, inspired by Stalnaker (1975) , is that if(j> would V is felicitous in a context c only if there is at least one world w^c such that Sim^rev^c) + (j)) is not a subset of c + if). (A rationale for this might be that the counterfactual is the marked choice and thus pre-empted by the indicative conditional when one might as well have used the latter.)
42 Proof: suppose the CCP of <f> is defined for exactly those contexts which entail p. The definition in (61) thus amounts to rev^c) -u pC: c £ X C p ). We need to show that rev^(c) entails p iff c does. First, assume that c does not entail p. Then no superset of c does, so (X: c^X£p)-0 and its union is W and doesn't either. Second, assume that c does entail p. It is true that we conclude that the speaker has a camera and that it is suitable for blackand-white photography. But, as Berman (1989) points out, we spontaneously conclude even more, namely that the speaker's camera is suitable for color, which is not a presupposition but the content of the complement clause. In other words, tell seems to be read factively in this example. But once a predicate is factive, then its being also a hole presents no additional mystery. Consider, for instance, the following meaning rule for the factive verb know, which implements the common idea that facrives presuppose their complements.
(ii) c + John knows that $ is undefined unless c -c + <j>.
Where defined, c + John knows that <j> -(w e c: Doxj(w) + 0 -same). This requires, among other things, that c + <ji be defined, thus that c satisfy any presuppositions of <j>. This is not a story, however, that could be extended to account for all cases where attitude verbs act like holes. If we control for facrivity, as in (iii) below, there is still a spontaneous interference that the speaker has a camera and it's suitable for black-and-white.
(iii) (This salesman told me a lot of lies, but at least) he didn't tell me that my camera was suitable for color too. 48 See Quine (1956) , Kaplan (1969) , Lewis (1979) , and others. I leave open here how de re construals are represented at LF; something along the lines of Creswell & Stechow (1982) should suit my purposes.
Of course, transposing their proposal into the present framework would first require an account of variables and quantification in a context change framework. This also goes beyond the scope of the present article, but see Heim (1983 Heim ( , 1988 .
49 See von Stechow (1981) for an explicitly descriprional analysis of factives, for instance. 50 As Rob van der Sandt pointed out to me, examples of this son are discussed in Fauconnier (1984) ; see also Zeevat (1991) .
51 One reason for my scepticism is that I don't see off-hand how this approach throws light on the appropriateness of also in the following minimal variation of (71): imagine John and Mary competed for one job, and everybody, including the parents, knew this.
(i) John: I, got the job. Mary: My parents think that I F also, got it. Why isn't alsojget the job a description that fits the property of getting the job when it happens that X; gets the job? We might amend the proposal so that a property only falls under the description abo t £ if it is true of x s and at least one other individual. But this is not quite what we need here, since the intuitive reason why (i) is out is not that Mary believes only one person got the job, but that her parents believe this.
52 This has also been argued for by von Stechow (1984) and it is tacitly taken for granted in Higginbotham (1989) . $3 It may also make it easier to reconcile the two-way de re/de ditto ambiguity of the standard theory with finer classifications such as the four-way distinction in Fodor (1979: 229) . (I owe this reference to Angelika Kratzer.) 54 In a theory like Gazdar's, this could be attributed to the mere fact that (66) also asserts that John believed there was rain. But we also infer such a belief in an analogous sentence like (i), where it can't have come as an entailment of the assertion. (That way, we'd only get that John wants there to have been rain.) (i) John wants it to stop raining soon. So there is evidence independent of our analysis that the presupposition that the subject believes the complement's presupposition is generally accommodated in addition to the presupposition that it is true in fact.
55 See, e.g., Soames (1989: 567) . 56 It is not quite complete for the reason given in n. 18.
